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ABSTRACT 
 
Given the economy’s complex behavior and sudden transitions as evidenced in the 2007–08 
crisis, agent-based models are widely considered a promising alternative to current 
macroeconomic practice dominated by DSGE models. Their failure is commonly interpreted 
as a failure to incorporate heterogeneous interacting agents. This paper explains that 
complex behavior and sudden transitions also arise from the economy’s financial structure as 
reflected in its balance sheets, not just from heterogeneous interacting agents. It introduces 
“flow-of-funds” and “accounting” models, which were preeminent in successful 
anticipations of the recent crisis. In illustration, a simple balance-sheet model of the 
economy is developed to demonstrate that nonlinear behavior and sudden transition may 
arise from the economy’s balance-sheet structure, even without any microfoundations. The 
paper concludes by discussing one recent example of combining flow-of-funds and agent-
based models. This appears a promising avenue for future research. 
 
Keywords: Credit Crisis; Finance; Complex Systems; DSGE; Agent-based Models; Stock-
flow Consistent Models 
 
JEL Classifications: B52, C63, E32, E37, E44 
   2
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2007–08 credit crisis and ensuing recession was a sudden transition of the economy 
from one state to another, similar to such transitions in physical and biological complex 
systems (Scheffer 2009). Unsurprisingly therefore, critics of mainstream macroeconomics 
have called for the application of complex system theory as the new leading paradigm in 
macroeconomics. In particular, agent-based models (ABMs for short) have become widely 
discussed. A search in the economic literature database EconLit by this author shows that the 
number of studies with the phrase “agent-based” in the summary was 165 in the four years 
2003–06 and 278 over 2007–10 (Econlit 2011). The first ABM-style macroeconomic 
textbook appears in 2011 under the title Macroeconomics from the Bottom-Up (Delle Gatti et 
al. 2011), a phrase now adopted for some mainstream models as well (De Grauwe 2010). 
The Economist (2010: 22) singled out ABMs as better financial crises predictors than the 
currently dominant “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium” (or DSGE) approach to 
modeling the macroeconomy. And a recent World Bank Working Paper titled “A Flaw in the 
Model that Defines How the World Works” argues that this model “should be replaced by an 
approach using agent-based scenario analysis” (Bieta et al. 2010). 
This present paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by noting that ABMs 
constitute a method rather than a theory, so that their acceptance still leaves open the 
question of which new theoretical framework is an alternative to DSGE models. If the 
problem with DSGE models is that they neither helped anticipate financial instability nor 
provided insights and policy implications after the fact, one conclusion is that we should turn 
to those models which did. Prominent among them were so-called flow-of-fund models. This 
leads to four questions pertinent to the paradigmatic shift in modeling financial instability. 
How is financial instability modeled in current macroeconomics, and what are the problems? 
What is the nature of models that have been empirically helpful in anticipating the latest 
financial instability? Can such models in principle capture the behavior of complex 
systems—in particular, nonlinearities and sudden transitions? And can these models be 
married to ABMs? 
The failure of DSGE-style macroeconomics was a failure to meaningfully include 
finance in its models, not just a failure to model heterogeneous interacting agents. To 
augment the models with price rigidities (Smets and Wouters 2003) or heterogeneous 
interacting agents (De Grauwe 2010) is a solution to other problems of representative-agents 
equilibrium models, but not to the problem posed by the 2007–08 financial crisis. The   3
difference is very widely neglected. To start addressing it, this paper first discusses how the 
structure of mainstream economic models prevents a meaningful modeling of finance. 
Section 3 introduces other economic theory that locates the source of credit cycles and 
financial instability in the financial nature of capitalism: in its use of money rooted in debt, 
and the interaction between asset markets and the real sector that gives rise to balance-sheet 
effects. It follows that the challenge is to explicitly model the economy’s financial instability 
as residing in its financial structure, rather than in exogenous shocks in the real sector 
coupled with price rigidities (as DSGE models do) or only in the behavioral interactions of 
its agents (as in the behavioral finance approach). Both these approaches locate the source of 
instability ultimately (or exclusively, in the case of DSGEs) in individual behavior. But we 
know that causes of complex behavior (nonlinearities and sudden transitions) need not be 
exclusively micro-founded—they may also be meso-founded, in the interaction of 
components of the system. After all, “[c]omplex systems are comprised of multiple 
interacting components, or agents, whose interaction gives rise to new system qualities” 
(ACS 2011). 
 This is not to deny that exogenous shocks or behavioral interactions can also be 
sources of instability. But to confine the theoretical explanation to them would be to miss the 
structural tendency towards instability that is built into the financial relations found in every 
modern economy. The bulk of the paper is therefore devoted to addressing the third question 
above—can balance-sheet models capture nonlinearities and sudden transitions? From 
section 4, a deliberately simple model of a balance-sheet economy without explicit 
microfoundations is developed. It is demonstrated in simulations that this gives rise to 
complex behavior. The concluding section discusses recent work that combines the balance-
sheet approach with agent-based modeling. 
 
2. EQUILIBRIUM MODELS AND THE PROBLEM OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
 
The ruling paradigm of today’s macroeconomics rests on two fundamental building blocks: 
its behavioral underpinning and its system view. The behavioral underpinning of 
neoclassical economics is methodological individualism with optimization. This entails that 
an economy can be modeled as representative agents optimizing some objective function 
reflecting their preferences and with given constraints—such as profit for entrepreneurs, 
consumption for consumers, and a welfare function for the government. Methodological 
individualism dictates that all economic phenomena, whether observed on the level of firms,   4
sectors, economies, or globally, should be explained in terms of individual optimization. In 
the strong version, this implies that the whole is not more than the parts. A weaker version 
allows for interactions between agents to modify the economic system’s properties, with a 
feedback loop to individual behavior. This allows for a separate, though still micro-founded, 
role of system properties. Methodological individualism with optimization has also won 
currency in other social sciences, a development known as “economics imperialism” (Lazear 
2000). One reason why ABMs enjoys growing popularity among economists may be that 
they safeguard methodological individualism. 
The second foundation of neoclassical economics is the notion of the economy as a 
system in equilibrium. The outcome of individual optimization processes, and thus the 
solution of the model, is a stable equilibrium (or several equilibria), which is a set of 
parameter values that characterizes the economy as a system and from which it can only 
deviate due to shocks from outside. There is no endogenous instability. Markets are 
conceived as always in a state of, or tending towards, a stable equilibrium. In an economy 
modeled as several markets (e.g., for labor, for goods, and for financial assets), each market 
reaches equilibrium in such a way that this is consistent and interconnected with equilibrium 
conditions in other markets. This is the multi-market or “general” equilibrium model, first 
developed by Léon Walras in the 1870s.  
General equilibrium models have become the workhorse models for modern 
macroeconomics since the demise of Keynesianism in the late 1970s. Their latest incarnation 
is the “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium” (or DSGE) model, which allows for 
distributions of realizations (hence stochastic), and studying transitions from one equilibrium 
to another (hence dynamic). De Grauwe (2010) is a good recent discussion of DGSE 
limitations and possible extensions. An and Schorfheide (2007: 113) note that they “have 
become very popular in macroeconomics over the past 25 years. They are taught in virtually 
every PhD program and represent a significant share of publications in macroeconomics.” 
DSGE models are also ubiquitous in policy analyses by international institutions and central 
banks—see, for instance, introductions to the DSGE model used by the IMF (Botman et al. 
2007), the European Central Bank (Smets and Wouters 2003), or the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (Lees 2009).  
Given their predominance at the time of the crisis, DSGE models have come in for 
vocal criticism from within the profession. Well-know economists such as Buiter (2009) 
have argued that DSGE models are unable to describe the highly nonlinear dynamics of 
economic fluctuations, making training in “state of the art” macroeconomic modeling “a   5
privately and socially costly waste of time and resources.” Solow (2010), one of the 
grandfathers of current macroeconomic theory, testified in July 2010 for the US Senate that 
DSGE models “take it for granted that the whole economy can be thought about as if it were 
a single, consistent person or dynasty carrying out a rationally designed, long-term plan, 
occasionally disturbed by unexpected shocks, but adapting to them in a rational, consistent 
way. The protagonists of this idea make a claim to respectability by asserting that it is 
founded on what we know about microeconomic behavior, but I think that this claim is 
generally phony.” The defense (as by Chari [2010]) has typically been to point out that 
DSGE models are more sophisticated than their critics suppose, especially because they can 
incorporate frictional unemployment, financial market imperfections, and sticky prices and 
wages. 
However, such “stable-with-friction models” (Leijonhofvud 2009) can mimic 
nonlinear dynamics but not the financial causes of those nonlinearities. This is because 
DSGE models are characterized by the “absence of an appropriate way of modeling financial 
markets” (Tovar 2008: 29). The reason is that in DSGEs, the monetary side of the economy 
is fully determined in the real sphere. Agents make decision about producing, consuming, 
and investing based on the available resources, preferences, and prices. Money is treated as 
an add-on to the real economy, a mere unit of account that allows for comparing the values 
of goods and services, facilitating individual optimal choice. Given the outcome of the 
optimization process, the financial sector is modeled as passively providing the means to 
execute the necessary transactions in labor, goods, and services. Therefore money must exist 
strictly in proportion to the sum value of all real-sector transactions—that is, to real-sector 
output.  
This determinateness is a problem when it comes to understanding financial 
instability, which can arise only if financial liquidity is created in excess of real output, as 
discussed in more detail below. DSGE models so exclude the possibility of financial 
instability. Moreover, the equilibrium concept also prevents the explicit modeling of 
financial variables that are not fully determined in the real-sector optimization processes that 
drive the model. Even though the tacit assumptions are that financial flows (e.g., of profit 
and interest) exist, Godley and Shaikh (2002) demonstrate that explicating the financial 
flows implied by DGSE model outcomes would undermine key model properties such as 
optimization in real (not nominal) terms, and leads to anomalies, such as falling prices, when 
the money supply expands. Making finance explicit is disastrous for DSGE models, because   6
financial variables then are shown to move in ways that are incompatible with the 
determinate equilibrium path of DSGE models. 
That is why DSGE models cannot, in principle, incorporate the financial sector and 
credit creation. And in a model world where credit does not exist, a credit crisis cannot be 
anticipated. This was due not to bad luck or exceptional conditions, but to the very structure 
of macroeconomics’ core models: the price for model consistency on DGSE terms is that 
finance cannot be modeled and financial crisis cannot exist. Alan Greenspan professed to 
“shocked disbelief” while watching his “whole intellectual edifice collapse in the summer of 
[2007].” Glenn Stevens, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, asserted in December 
2008: “I do not know anyone who predicted this course of events. This should give us cause 
to reflect on how hard a job it is to make genuinely useful forecasts.” 
All attempts to notionally integrate finance into a DSGE or other equilibrium models 
must picture the financial sector as a mere conduit of existing money from savers to 
investors, strictly proportionate to current output in the real sector—as if money’s only 
function was to circulate goods and services. This denies the nature of finance, which is 
leverage: the creation of debt claims and credit instruments in excess of current output. 
Banks create money, they do not just pass it on from savers to investors (FRBC 1992; FRBD 
2001; Werner 1997). Where credit cycles are ostensibly treated in neoclassical 
macroeconomics, what is really modeled are external (not financial) shocks exacerbated by 
finance. Imperfections in financial markets may amplify and exacerbate shocks from outside 
the financial sector, as in the seminal Kyotaki and Moore (1997) model titled Credit Cycles. 
But there is nothing special about finance in this respect; the same role could be fulfilled by 
wage rigidity in labor markets. Instability is modeled, but not the sort of instability that 
finance precipitates by the build-up of debt relative to the size of the economy. A quarter 
century ago, Bernanke (1983: 258) already wrote that “only the older writers seemed to take 
the disruptive impact of financial breakdown for granted.” This neglect was the intellectual 
background for the rise of DSGE models to prominence—a state of affairs which left 
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3. UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: FLOW OF FUND MODELS 
 
Outside of the neoclassical confines in which Chairman Greenspan and Governor Stevens 
moved, the crisis had been anticipated by (literally) scores of nonorthodox economists, often 
with remarkable precision regarding the timing and the mechanism of the collapse (AFEE 
2010). One example is the work by Godley and collaborators of the Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College (NY). They consistently argued from 2000 that the stability of the 
1990s and 2000s was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ debt growth, in turn 
fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector and its derivative products (Godley and Wray 
2000; Godley and Zezza 2006). They correctly predicted recession in the United States while 
official forecasters (e.g., the US Congressional Budget Office) were still optimistic—for 
details, see Bezemer (2009b, 2009d, 2010b, 2011a). 
Godley made his predictions based on a flow-of-funds framework (presented in 
Godley [1999] and Godley and Lavoie [2007]) which built on an older strand of economic 
thinking outside the general-equilibrium orthodoxy. Theorists including MacLeod, Wicksell, 
Mises, Hayek, Irving Fisher, Veblen, Schumpeter, Keynes, Kalecki, Minsky, and Tobin 
theorized true finance-induced macroeconomic instability. Because of their emphasis on the 
economy’s financial nature reflected in balance sheets, Skaggs (2003) and others have 
identified this line of thinking as the “accounting approach” tradition in economics. Minsky 
(1986: 34), for instance, wrote that his analysis would be “based on accounting identities.” 
Godley and Lavoie (2007b) introduce an “accounting framework” (p. 18) to 
macroeconomics by writing that the aspiration is to “describe the evolution of the whole 
economic system, with all financial transactions (including changes in the money supply) 
fully integrated” (p. xxxiv). “The fact that money stocks and flows must satisfy accounting 
equalities in individual budgets and in an economy as a whole provides a fundamental law of 
macroeconomics analogous to the principle of conservation of energy in physics” (Godley 
and Cripps 1983: 14). 
This strand of theories locates the economy’s instability in its financial structure, not 
only in the behavior of its agents. Skaggs (2003) notes that critical elements linking these 
analysts are their “treating money as rooted in debt (so emphasizing that every credit is 
mirrored in a debit); avoiding equilibrium analysis, but rather thinking in terms of unfolding 
processes; and treating banks as creators of credit, not mere intermediaries”; and they 
“refused to net out assets and liabilities, and rejected extreme aggregation.” Specifically, the 
key features of their and others’ credit cycle theories are: (1) “free” credit flows not   8
determinately linked to real-sector growth; (2) assets distinguished from money; (3) debt as 
the counterpart of credit and, especially in Minsky; (4) the economy as shaped by accounting 
constraints implied in its financial nature (Bezemer 2011a). Consider these in turn. 
“Free” credit flows can only exist if credit (and credit-money) is recognized to be 
created “out of nothing.” There are no “free resources” (or savings) in the real sector, which 
are the loanable funds that limit the expansion of the credit system. Rather, crediting bank 
accounts is how financial resources are created and, in the short run, there is no necessary 
and direct link to real-sector income. Credit expansion or contraction can be self-propelled 
for long periods of time. Moreover, credit flows over and above those linked to current 
output have to be linked to some other market, namely asset markets (dispensable in (DS)GE 
models). Realistic models of finance-real sector interactions therefore need a dual economy, 
with finance explicitly modeled and distinct from the real economy and assets distinguished 
from money. Finally, by balance-sheet identity credit is also debt, so that the economy is 
subject to an overarching accounting constraint. This constraint is key to the peaking of a 
credit boom and the real-sector consequences of a debt deflation. 
Thus, the effects of credit and debt are not addressed by introducing sticky wages or 
price rigidity (as in DSGE models), nor agent heterogeneity and interaction effects (as in 
ABMs). The accounting approach captures the financial nature of modern capitalism, 
neglected in neoclassical macroeconomics and also most other (including most ABM-based) 
work. Financial structure is nevertheless one source for the economy’s complex-system 
behavior. The next section develops a model that reflects this in the simplest possible 
manner. In particular, it explicates the economy’s balance sheets but abstracts from 
specifying individual behavior in order to bring out that instability is (partly) based in the 
economy’s financial structure. 
 
4. A SIMPLIFIED BALANCE-SHEET APPROACH 
 
Schumpeter (1954: 717) advised to “look upon capitalist finance as a clearing system that 
cancels claims and debts and carries forward the differences—so that ‘money’ payments 
come in only as a special case without any particularly fundamental importance.” This might 
serve as the motto for the stock-flow consistent approach to macroeconomics as explained in 
Godley and Lavoie (2007); for recent theoretical contributions, see e.g., Dos Santos and 
Zezza (2007) and van Treek (2009). All financial transactions are credit/debit operations and 
the whole system is always subject to an overarching balance-sheet identity of the type   9
“credit = debt.” In particular, as Schumpeter emphasizes, money is just one type of credit 
and interacts with other types; since money creation is debt creation, the counterpart debt 
growth needs to be traced so as to understand dynamics. These are the two organizing 
principles in explaining how finance induces instability: a balance-sheet approach to the 
economic system, and distinction between money and other types of credit. To do this in a 
model as simply as possible (but not simpler), the economy is represented by the following 
balance-sheet identity: 
 
L + S = D + W 
 
where L denotes loans, S securities, D deposits, and W wealth. With assets on the left-hand 
side and liabilities on the right-hand side, this is a balancesheet identity from the financial 
sector’s point of view. Its assets are bank assets (loans to the nonfinancial sector L) and 
nonbank financial sector instruments, generically labeled “securities” (S). Its liabilities are 
the nonfinancial nonbank (or “real”) sector’s deposits (D) and its wealth (W). “Wealth” is 
the aggregate of all nondeposit assets held by the nonfinancial sector.
1 (In what follows, we 
will use “the real sector” and “the economy” interchangeably.) Identity 1 brings out the 
overarching accounting identity that whenever the economy’s assets (deposit money and 
wealth) increase, its liabilities increase. In particular, the sum total of the money stock D and 
the value of transactions in wealth W, both held by the real sector, can grow in nominal 
value only if banks and nonbank financial institutions create the liquidity needed for these 
transactions by lending to real-sector agents, accumulating debt claims against the real 
sector.
2 In the remainder of this section the identity is explained. It is convenient to do this in 
flow terms (denoted d). 
When banks lend, the real sector receives the newly created liquidity on deposit and 
then uses it in transactions of goods and services or in wealth transactions (Caporale and 
Howells 2001; Werner 1997). So far, that means dL = dD + dW. In words, fresh lending 
monetizes (i.e., provides the financial resources for) the additional transactions in goods and 
                                                 
1 This representation implies a balance sheet aggregation choice. Common stocks, issued by firm to households, 
or public debt, issued by the government, remain implicit in Wealth. Its distribution over firms, households, 
and government is not specified, so that (for instance) common stock held as a household’s asset and a firm’s 
liability cancels out. Debt from nonfinancial firms to households does not appear on the financial sector’s 
balance sheet. Also, we do not separate out a foreign sector. 
2 Note that the value of the total wealth stock is larger than the value of transactions in wealth. The valuation of 
nontraded wealth titles may change as a result of rising transaction prices of traded wealth titles. Below we 
capture the difference in parameter qW. This wealth change has real effects (e.g., consumption) but in monetary 
terms it is “virtual” in that it occurs without an attendant rise in liquidity dL.   10
services that constitute economic growth dD as well as the additional transactions in wealth 
dW. But lending also induces return flows of interest and principal repayment. Repayment is 
from deposits and this reduces the levels of loans and of deposits in equal measure. These 
interest-driven repayment flows are key to finance-induced instability of the system, even 
though “it is standard practice… to ignore interest payments” (Godley 1999: 405). 
The economy’s repayment of loans does not simply accumulate in the financial 
sector. They are capitalized into new loans or into investment instruments. We label this new 
asset class generically “securities,” denoted S. For the financial sector to reinvest return 
payments means to plow it back into the real sector, replenishing dD to its initial level before 
repayment, and raising S accordingly. S epitomizes the nonbank financial sector. Including it 
means adding its assets to the left-hand side of the identity, resulting in 
 
dL+dS=dD+dW, or (in stock terms) the above identity L+S=D+W. 
 
There are two types of securities S. Part of S is equity investment, allowing the 
nonbank financial sector to establish non-interest-bearing claims on output (i.e., to buy 
shares ands bonds). As a result, the real sector has increased in size (by dD) and in liabilities 
(by dS; it now has both loan and equity liabilities). Equity, by establishing new claims on 
output, changes the distribution of income between the real and the nonbank financial sector. 
The other destination for repayment flows is securitization as we know it: the returns 
on loans are repackaged as new interest-bearing financial instruments. This has future 
repayment implications. Either way, repayment flows from the real to the financial sector are 
converted into claims held by the nonbank financial sector on the real sector. 
 
5. LINKING FINANCE AND THE ECONOMY 
 
Recall that the problem in (DS)GE models is that finance is linked to the economy by 
assuming away “free” credit flows, as if money’s role is only to circulate goods and services 
in the real sector. In model terms, this is to assume that dD is the only monetary variable that 
matters and that dL, dS, and dW can be safely left out of the model. By assuming that money 
is a unit of account, it is assumed that any growth of the economy (denoted Y) that increases 
real-sector transactions by amount dY is always automatically accommodated by growth of 
money dD. In sum, in standard macro models the assumptions are that dL=dS=dW=0 and   11
dD=dY. In this section we show that the second assumption has very strong credentials 
while the first precludes any meaningful analysis of credit cycles or financial instability. 
Theoretically, any increase in the sum of all final goods-and-services transactions 
that make up the gross domestic product (GDP, or Y) must be mirrored in bank credit 
creation supporting transactions of final goods and services.
3 In other words, bank lending to 
the real economy D should indeed be constant in proportion to the size of the economy, and 
so dD = dY. To equate growth in bank lending to the real sector to nominal economic 
growth is not a novel idea. Marx in Capital wrote of “productive credit, whose volume 
grows with the growing volume of production,” implying parity of credit for goods-and-
services transactions with the volume of production of goods and services—true by 
definition. Werner (1997) found for the case of Japan that fluctuations in credit to the real 
sector and in GDP indeed have a correlation coefficient very close to one. Federal Reserve 
analysts also note for the United States that “over long periods of time there has been a fairly 
close relationship between the growth of debt of the nonfinancial sectors and aggregate 
economic activity” (Board 2009: 76). We may also show this long-term relation for the 
United States from the 1950s to just before the 2007 crisis. The growth of lending to the 
nonfinancial sector maps indeed virtually one-on-one onto growth of aggregate economic 















                                                 
3 Effects on GDP of changes in inventory and interfirm trade credit are abstracted from.   12
Figure 1: Lending to the Real Sector Equates to Nominal Economic Growth 
 
        Source: Bezemer (2009a) 
 
The contrast is to flows of other, “free” credit issued by US banks, defined in the US 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) classification as the Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate (or FIRE) sectors. They rose five-fold in proportion to the US economy since the 
1950s. Thus, the bulk of the economy’s financial flows are left out of DSGE models. These 
flows constitute what Minsky termed the “managed money” that is the domain of savings 
institutions, credit unions, funding corporations, property-casualty and life insurance 
companies, mortgage pools, closed-end funds, exchange traded finds, private pension funds, 
money market mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, security brokers and dealer, and 
the like. In terms of instruments, US domestic FIRE-sector debt is mainly (for about 95%) 
credit market instruments, primarily bank debt and some bonds (see Bezemer [2009] for 
further detail). In model terms, this credit other than used for goods-and-services 
transactions is by definition comprised of “free” financial flows, to the amount (W+S). 
Key to understanding finance-induced instability is “leverage” (Geanakoplos 2008), 
which is the ratio of the real sector’s IOUs (the sum of debt-financed wealth W and 
securities S) to its deposit base D. If leverage will be measured by (W+S)/D, it follows that 
the rise in debt that is the balance-sheet counterpart to FIRE sector credit flows (W and S are 
both debt financed) must imply an increase in the economy’s leverage, that is: in its debt-to-  13
GDP ratio
4 or, in the model terms defined above, in (W+S)/D. Analysts have indeed noted 




Dynamics are shaped by five parameters: nominal interest rate i, loan maturity m, 
securitization ρ, the economy’s nominal growth rate y, and the nominal wealth growth rate w. 
While the values for economic growth and wealth growth evolve endogenously, parameters 
for securitization, maturity, and interest rate will be given constant values in the simulations 
below, so as to bring out that financial instability arises from the structure of financial 
capitalism, not from variations in its financial parameters. This is the key point made in 
Minsky’s work: to have sophisticated financial markets (asset markets distinguished from 
money) is to have financial fragility and instability. In particular, it bears emphasizing that 
instability dynamics do not exist because of interest rate movements. They exist because of 
the structure of leverage, the key element of capitalist finance. Geanakoplos (2009: 9) calls 
for an end to “the obsession with interest rates” and asserts that “regulating leverage, not 
interest, is the solution for a troubled economy.” Endogenizing interest rates and making 
them variable does of course bring in additional dynamics that occur in reality. But 
Geneakoplos’ point is that these may be secondary phenomena. The simulations below 
indeed show that credit cycles and financial instability exist also without changes in interest 
rates. 
The growth rules are the following. Per period total lending dL by the real sector is 
determined by its cost (interest i) and its expected benefits. We use simple backward-looking 
expectation formation. In case of lending for real-sector production and consumption leading 
to dD, the expected benefit is based on the GDP growth rate y = dY in the last period. In the 
case of lending for wealth investments (such as mortgages) leading to dW, the wealth 
formation preference is shaped by both past income growth y (more wealth titles are 
acquired when income is higher) and the wealth growth rate w = dW in the last period 
(higher returns on wealth investments attract more wealth investment). With scaling 
parameters qD , qW, simple growth rules capturing this are 
                                                 
4 The fact that wealth cannot grow unless debt grows is an aggregate accounting identity, not an individual-
level assumption on how wealth is financed. Over the course of a credit boom, successive owners of an asset 
may sell the asset at a profit, but their buyers will have to shoulder proportionally more debt (or divert more of 
their real-sector income) in order to acquire the asset, balanced (for the time being) by the asset’s value. Asset 
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Since the deposit stock increases with the size of the economy (Y=D) there is no net 
repayment per period (i.e., lending is larger than repayment) if economic growth is positive. 
What does need to be repaid are loans to finance wealth transactions. In each period t, 
repayment of such loans (principal and interest) is from deposits, with the amount 
determined by interest and maturity parameters i and m, and some scaling parameter qR. 
Recall that repayment flows may be channeled into equity investment or into 
securitization, where the returns on loans are repackaged as new interest-bearing loans. Both 
types of securities constitute wealth (a claim on output). Therefore they are interchangeable 
with (other) wealth W held by the nonfinancial sector (such as property and currency). It 
follows that the rate of increase of securities will be viewed as a rate of return on wealth 
investment. Past rates of return on securities and wealth will be among the determinants of 
current wealth investments. This is the way we capture the link between nonbank financial 
sector growth with investment decisions in the real sector. Thus, rising loan repayment flows 
capitalized into equities do not, by themselves, increase leverage; they increase D pari passu 
with rising S, at constant ratio (W+S)/D. But the higher rate of return on holding wealth that 
this implies causes more future lending for wealth investment W rather than for investment 
in real-sector growth D. This does increase leverage. Having dS depend on past values of S 
reflects the securitization feedback loop that makes growth of securitization self-propelled. 
With a constant parameter ρ (0<ρ<1) denoting the share of cumulative repayment that is loan 
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with scaling parameter qS. This concludes the model. With four variables and five 
parameters, it is perhaps the simplest model that still has the following five features: 
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1.  The economy is shaped by, not merely reflected in, balance sheets. 
2.  The real sector and the financial sector’s flows are separate, because the real sector’s 
money (deposits) and wealth are separate from the financial sector’s assets 
(securities). But they do interact (point 4, below). 
3.  Within the financial sector, the function of banks and nonbanks is separated (loans 
making versus securities trading)—even though actual banks may mix them. 
4.  Securities trading effects the real sector’s wealth and increased lending elicits return 
flows of interest and financial fees. These are the key mechanisms of real-sector 
effect of finance. 
 
Following Godley’s dictum (e.g., Godley and Lavoie 2007: xii), the model has so-called 
stock-flow consistency throughout. In model terms, this means that the identity L + S = D + 
W is always satisfied because in flow terms, in each period dL + dS = dD + dW holds. 
Everything is in nominal terms for, as Minsky (1986) emphasized, it is nominal values for 
assets and debt that are among the financial causes of cycles and crisis. Model properties 
suffice to generate endogenous cycles, and instability of cycles due to increasing leverage. 
But as we will see, the timing and severity of instability depend on the nature of 




Without leverage, there are no finance-induced cycles. This is because finance is leverage. 
With W=S=0 the model reduces to L=D, as in DSGE models: all credit creation is for the 
real sector, which grows autoregressively according to growth rule G.1, with rules G.2 and 
G.3 irrelevant. Loan repayment is not invested in securities, but just creates the financial 
room for new bank lending to the real sector. In the present specification of G.1, growth 
tapers off. For instance, with starting values {Y=D=10,000, W=S=0} and parameters {i = 6 
%,   w0=y0= 3 %, m=10 years, qD = 6} income Y converges in 30 periods to a level that is 
stable to 2 decimal points percentage growth, with income growth rate y converging to zero. 
Changes in parameter values change the pattern and the speed of convergence. For instance, 
with i = 4 %, growth first rises before falling, and the stable level is reached after 20 periods. 
This hypothetical simulation links in with the central role of finance for economic growth to 
occur at all in capitalists systems—or as Schumpeter, Keynes, and Minsky emphasized, 
capitalism is inherently financial capitalism.   16
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Starting values:  D=Y=10,000  
   W = S = 0  
yo = 3 % 
Parameters: i = 6 %, qD = 6, m=10, ρ= 0 
 
 
In the second simulation we introduce leverage without securitization by setting starting 
values Wo=So=10 and ρ=0 so that growth rules G.2 and G.3 come into play, and all else 
equal. Again, we normalize interest to 1% by setting qD = 1/i = 6. Figure 3 below shows 
three variables: income growth dY/Y, leverage (W+S)/Y, and net flows from finance to the 
economy, which is (dD+dW-dS)/Y, all multiplied by 100 to yield percentages of Y. The 
simulations over the short run (200 periods) show cyclicality of income and of financial 
flows, with increasing levels of leverage. As was the case with postwar US growth, each 
business cycle starts at a higher level of leverage. Leverage itself is also cyclical. 
The bottom panel in figure 3 shows that the model is financially sustainable in the 
short run, in the sense that all financial obligations can be met. This is indicated by a 
“financial sustainability” measure, which subtracts the flow of net payments from the real to 
the financial sector (dS) from the stock of financial means to service this payment (D+W), 
all scaled by Y. Since D=Y, this measure (D+W-dS)/Y is equivalent to (1 + (W-dS)/Y), or 
one plus the excess of wealth over repayment obligations. Situations with (W-dS)<0 are 
clearly financially unsustainable in this model.
5 However, in the equity scenario in the short 
run, financial sustainability is on an increasing trend, as figure 3b shows. 
                                                 
5 This should be viewed as a minimum value for financial unsustainability. In the real world, even dipping 
below some positive lower threshold value for (W-dS) will be financially unsustainable. Reasons include that at 
this point financial market participants can foresee the W<dS point approaching and that fire sales of assets 
depress asset prices and reduce repayment capacity.   17
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financial sustainability (D+W-R)/Y
 
Starting values:  D0=Y0=10,000  
   W 0=S0=10 
y0 = w0= 3 % 
Parameters: i = 6 %, qD=qw=6, m=10, ρ= 0 
 
 
That instability is nevertheless built into the fabric of financial capitalism, as Minsky (1986) 
explained, becomes clear only in the medium run (700 periods). Figure 4 (bottom panel) 
shows for the same settings that the cyclical minimum value for financial sustainability 
peaks at value 3.36 for t=244, and sinks to just above value one (1.08) at it last realization (at 
t=516) before the system implodes around point 590. (Recall that value one for financial 
sustainability means that that period’s repayment obligations can just be met out of total 
wealth W). However, since peak values for financial sustainability rise much more than 
trough values fall, average values continue to increases right until the crash. These peaks 
reflect the skyrocketing asset values typical of the last phase of a credit boom, aptly labeled   18
the “winner’s curse” phase by Harrison (2008). Leverage and financial flows to the economy 
also peak before they turn negative and the system collapses. 
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We now introduce securitization by setting ρ = 0.1 and everything else equal. Figure 5 shows 
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Figure 5: The Securitization Scenario in the Short Run: Higher Growth but Declining 
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financial sustainability (D+W-R)/Y
 
Starting values:  D0=Y0=10,000  
   W 0=S0=10 
y0 = w0= 3 % 
Parameters: i = 6 %, qD=qw=6, m=10, ρ= 0.1 
 
 
The differences with the equity regime are noteworthy (note the different scale): 
 
1)  Securitization is good for growth, in the short and medium run. The upward trend in 
income growth is now much stronger. 
2)  Securitization amplifies and intensifies the business cycle. The demeaned normalized 
standard deviation of growth increases. Within the first 200 periods, securitized 
growth goes through 7 cycles, equity growth through 6.    20
3)  Leverage increases exponentially. After 100 periods it is at about the same level 
(peaking at about 5) as in the equity scenario but at t = 200 it peaks at double the 
level attained in the equity regime. It also exhibits stronger increasing cyclicality. 
4)  Over time, booms become shorter and troughs longer than in the equity scenario. 
5)  While the peak values for financial sustainability continue to increase, its trough 
values start declining already after t=85. 
 
Thus, already in the short run it is clear that securitization-led growth is financially 
unsustainable, although very profitable. A 400-period simulation shows that the system 
implodes at about t=250 (figure 6). 
  
Figure 6: The Securitization Scenario in the Long Run: Growth and Volatility are 
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Finally, there is another noteworthy difference between the equity and securitization 
scenarios. Minsky (1978, 1986) in his early work analyzed that in postwar financial 
capitalism, financial fragility builds in the good times and periodically morphs into financial 
instability. These crises are then managed by massive government deficit spending and 
central bank lending, stabilizing the system at increasingly higher levels of leverage, and 
setting the scene for the next boom. In later work, however, Minsky noted the increasing 
influence of securitization in achieving those higher levels of leverage (e.g., Minsky 2008 
[1987]). Minsky worried that what he called the “money manager capitalism” that he saw 
emerging in the 1980s and 1990s undermined capitalism’s viability by redirecting 
investment to financial, not real, investments and capital formation (Wray 2009). 
Figure 7 illustrates this difference in postcrisis viability of the two systems. It plots 
the stocks of securities, deposits, and wealth. In the equity scenario, recurrent growth and 
instability characterizes the system also in the very long run (3,000 periods). In the 
securitization scenario, the initial crash occurs at much higher levels of leverage and is final. 
Only a change in the system itself that reduces leverage (a change represented by ρ) could 
revive it. Geneakoplos (2009) likewise comments that “reduction of leverage, not interest, is 
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Figure 7: Securitization (top) and Equity (bottom) Scenarios, Very Long Run:  








































Note: Wealth is on the right-hand scale 
 
 
8. SUMMARY, REFLECTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper explored the methodological shift in macroeconomics towards agent-based 
models, widely considered to be a promising alternative to current macroeconomic practice 
dominated by DGSE models. It explains that complex behavior and sudden transitions also 
arise from the economy’s financial structure as reflected in its balance sheets, not just from 
heterogeneous interacting agents. It introduces “flow-of-funds” or “accounting” models, 
which were preeminent in successful anticipations of the recent crisis. 
In illustration, a simple balance-sheet model of the economy is developed to demonstrate 
that nonlinear behavior and sudden transition may arise from the economy’s balance-sheet 
structure, even without any microfoundations. Finance implies leverage, which implies   23
cycles of increasing amplitude in real and financial variables. Because financially 
sustainable growth requires minimum values for the means to meet financial obligations, 
increasing cycle amplitude with higher peaks and lower troughs leads to a situation of crisis, 
which implodes the system. 
The paper explores two types of leverage, under the headings of “equity” and 
“securitization” scenarios. It is demonstrated that securitization leads to higher growth, more 
cycles, and higher peaks for all variables but also longer trough periods and deeper troughs 
values. The model mimics postwar developments with increasing levels of leverage over 
business cycles and suggest that the system survives crises in the equity scenario but not in 
the securitization scenario. 
It is not difficult to think of further analyses and extensions to this model, which the 
scope of the present paper prohibits. Robustness should be evaluated more extensively by 
studying the effects of changes in starting and parameter values. Inflation could be included, 
studying real as well as nominal dynamics. Different classes of assets (bond, stocks, and real 
estate) and players (central and commercial banks) could be introduced, as well as a trade 
and capital flows with a foreign sector and more detail in the real sector with regard to 
consumption patterns, savings behavior, production technologies, labor use, wages and 
prices, inventories, and industry disaggregation. It should be noted, however, that detailed 
flow of fund models (often with tens or hundreds of equations) exist, both theoretical and for 
specific economies. Even a “synthetic” model such as van Treek (2009) has 27 equations 
and the “Simplified, Benchmark Stock-flow Consistent Post-Keynesian Growth Model” by 
Dos Santos and Zezza (2007) has 66 equations. In a sense, extensions that make it more 
realistic would undermine the purpose of this stylized model, which was to demonstrate that 
complex behavior results from a complete but highly stylized balance-sheet model of the 
economy, even without all those extensions. A more complex model could easily obscure 
that financial instability resides (in part, at least) in the economy’s structure and not only in 
its policies or in the behavior of its agents. To demonstrate that was the aim of this paper.  
In conclusion, we return to the motivation for this exercise, set out in the opening 
sections. This was to argue that the failure of DSGE-style macroeconomics was a failure to 
meaningfully include finance in its models. Apart from that, there also is a failure to model 
complex systems arising from heterogeneous interacting agents. The present model 
deliberately left out microfoundations in order to focus on structures rather than behavior 
within those structures. A next step would be to add microfoundations to a financially 
credible agent-based model. To the best of this author’s knowledge, the only attempt to date   24
at doing this is reported in Cincotti, Raberto, and Teglis (2010). Based on the EURACE 
simulator environment, they develop a model linking the balance sheets of firms by double-
entry accounting, and applying overarching accounting constraints. Cincotti, Raberto, and 
Teglis (2010) simulate the effects of specific fiscal and monetary policies, depending on 
firm’s dividend payout policies. This research demonstrates, among other things, how a 
financially realistic representation and, especially, accounting constraints, modify the 
outcomes. To combine agent-based modeling with the economy’s core financial structure 
(its “balance-sheet dimension”) is a promising avenue for future research.   25
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